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Abstract
We show that, in a sufficiently large population satisfying certain statistical reg-
ularities, it is often possible to accurately estimate the utilitarian social welfare func-
tion, even if we only have very noisy data about individual utility functions and
interpersonal utility comparisons. In particular, we show that it is often possible
to identify an optimal or close-to-optimal utilitarian social choice using voting rules
such as the Borda rule, approval voting, relative utilitarianism, or any Condorcet-
consistent rule.
Keywords: utilitarian; relative utilitarian; approval voting; Borda; scoring rule;
Condorcet.
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1 Introduction
Utilitarianism may be philosophically attractive, but as a practical method for making
social decisions, it faces at least four major problems.
(Pr1) Interpersonal comparisons of utility are problematic. Even if we accept that such
interpersonal comparisons are meaningful in principle, it is not clear how precise
interpersonal comparisons could be made in practice.
(Pr2) It is difficult for the social planner to obtain accurate information about the voters’
utility functions. (It is not generally feasible to obtain a precise utility assessment
from every voter for every possible social alternative.)
(Pr3) Due to epistemic failures, a voter may have incorrect beliefs about the long-term
consequences of various policy alternatives. Furthermore, people fail to correctly
predict their own future utility level, even in apparently straightforward decision
problems (Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999). Indeed, there is ample empirical evi-
dence that people’s beliefs about their own past, present, and future happiness are
surprisingly unreliable, and subject to systematic biases, errors, and illusions (Kah-
neman et al., 1999). In short: voters do not even correctly perceive their own utility
functions.
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(Pr4) Voters may strategically misrepresent their utility functions (e.g. exaggerate the
intensity of their preferences) to manipulate a utilitarian social planner.
However, in this paper, we will show that these problems almost disappear in large popu-
lations of voters satisfying certain mild statistical assumptions. In Section 2, we show that
averaging utility data (even noisy or miscalibrated data) from a large population of voters
will yield a good approximation of utilitarianism with high probability, despite problems
(Pr1)-(Pr3). In particular, in Section 3, we show that the relative utilitarian social choice
rule yields such an approximation. In Section 4, we show that, if the voters’ utility func-
tions are related to their ordinal preferences through a plausible stochastic model, then
scoring rules (such as the Borda rule) will yield a good approximation of utilitarianism
with high probability, when the population is large. In Section 5, we provide a similar
result for approval voting. In Section 6, we first observe that, under a weak assumption
(called “reasonability”) about the statistical distribution of voter’s preferences, the Con-
dorcet winner will be the utilitarian social choice. We then show that reasonability holds
for several plausible statistical models of voter preferences. Finally, in the conclusion, we
briefly discuss how, for the perspective taken in this paper, problem (Pr4) can be solved
through virtual implementation.
Related literature. Lerner (1944, pp.29-32) was perhaps the first to deploy statisti-
cal aggregation to obviate the technical difficulties of utilitarianism. Under the plausible
assumption that all agents have diminishing marginal utility for wealth, Lerner famously
argued that, even in a state of total ignorance about the precise structure of people’s
cardinal utility functions, an egalitarian distribution of wealth would maximize the ex-
pected aggregate utility for society, because the expected utility gains of the poor under
such a wealth redistribution would more than cancel the expected utility losses of the rich.
Lerner’s original argument was obscure and generated much confusion; it was later clarified
by Breit and Culbertson Jr. (1970).1 For Lerner’s argument to work, his vague hypothesis
of “total ignorance” about individual utility functions must be formalized in terms of quite
specific assumptions about the probability distribution of the utility functions. The results
of Section 2 can be seen as an extension of this approach (although we draw no conclusions
about wealth redistribution).
Later, Bordley (1983) and Merrill (1984) used computer simulations to estimate the
expected value of the utilitarian social welfare function for various voting rules. More
recently, Caragiannis and Procaccia (2011) estimated the “distortion” of the plurality, ap-
proval, and antiplurality voting rules —that is, the worst-case ratio between the utilitarian
social welfare of the optimal alternative, and the utilitarian social welfare of the alternative
which actually wins, where the worst case is computed over all possible profiles of “normal-
ized” utility functions. (A utility function is “normalized” if it is positive and the utilities
sum to one.) Procaccia and Caragiannis were particularly interested in the asymptotic
growth rate of this distortion ratio as the number of voters and/or alternatives becomes
1See also the responses by Lerner (1970), Breit and Culbertson Jr. (1972), McCain (1972), and McManus
et al. (1972).
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large. They showed that, if voters randomly convert their cardinal utility functions into
voting behaviours in a plausible way, then the expected distortion ratio grows surprisingly
slowly. Their intended application was preference aggregation in a cooperating group of
artificially intelligent agents (e.g. Mars rovers), but their results are also applicable to
more traditional social welfare problems.
Meanwhile Apesteguia et al. (2011) considered scoring rules (e.g. the plurality, an-
tiplurality, and Borda rules) in a setting with three alternatives and honest voters; they
investigated the efficiency of these rules with respect to a one-parameter family of social
welfare functions (SWFs) which includes the utilitarian, maximin and maximax SWFs.
Their analytical results focus mainly on societies with two voters, whose utilities for the
three alternatives are independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables drawn
from a one-parameter family of probability distributions on the interval [0, 1] (including
the uniform distribution). They also presented numerical simulation results for somewhat
larger populations. Based on these simulations, they conjectured that, in the large popu-
lation limit, the Borda rule is the optimal scoring rule with respect to the utilitarian SWF.
We verify this conjecture in Section 4 (see Corollary 5).
Giles and Postl (2012) have conducted a similar investigation for (A,B)-voting rules, a
two-parameter family of rules introduced by Myerson (2002), which includes approval vote
as well as all scoring rules. Like Apesteguia et al., Giles and Postl suppose there are three
alternatives, whose utilities for each voter are privately known, i.i.d. random variables on
the interval [0, 1]. But unlike Apesteguia et al., they focus only on the utilitarian SWF, and
they allow for strategic voting. Giles and Postl first analytically characterize the symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) for the N -player strategic voting game for any N ≥ 2.
Then they numerically compute the expected value of the utilitarian SWF at the three-
player BNE for various (A,B) ∈ [0, 1]2 (where the three players’ utilities are i.i.d. random
variables drawn from either a uniform distribution or a beta distribution on [0, 1]). In a
very similar environment (three alternatives, independent uniformly distributed random
utilities, but many players), Kim (2012) constructs incentive-compatible voting rules which,
in terms of the utilitarian SWF, are superior to any ordinal rule (in particular, any scoring
rule), but which utilize only a limited amount of cardinal utility information from the
voters.
Like Kim (2012) and Giles and Postl (2012), this paper focuses only on the utilitarian
SWF, and considers a larger class of voting rules than Apesteguia et al. (2011). However,
unlike any of these three other papers, we work with an arbitrarily large set of alternatives,
and a very wide variety of statistical models of voter preferences. Instead of two- or three-
voter societies, our analytic results concern the asymptotic behaviour of societies with
hundreds or thousands of voters. Also, while these other papers are mainly concerned
with showing that some rules are better than others, or with finding the best rule within a
certain class (in terms of the expected value of the utilitarian SWF), we show that, under
certain conditions, certain rules actually approach perfect agreement with utilitarianism,
as the population becomes large. Finally, while the aforementioned papers suppose that
cardinal interpersonal utility comparisons are unproblematic, we allow the possibility that
these interpersonal comparisons are themselves highly ambiguous in practice (although
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still meaningful in principle). The results on scoring rules in Section 4 can thus be seen
as complementary to the results of Apesteguia et al. (2011), while the results on approval
voting in Section 5 are complementary to the findings of Giles and Postl (2012).
In a setting with only two alternatives, Schmitz and Tro¨ger (2012) have shown that
“weak” majority voting rules yield the highest expected value for the utilitarian SWF
amongst all dominant-strategy rules.2 They also review a series of much earlier papers
starting with Rae (1969), which investigated the utilitarian efficiency of qualified majority
rules in a two-alternative setting. In a similar spirit, in Section 6, we note that the Con-
dorcet winner will always maximize the utilitarian SWF for any “reasonable” profile of
utility functions, and any number of alternatives. We then show that such a “reasonable”
profile will occur with very high probability in large populations of voters with random
utility functions drawn from certain classes of probability distributions.
This paper presents asymptotic probabilistic results for large populations. It is not pos-
sible here to adequately summarise the vast and growing literature on the large-population
asymptotic probabilistic analysis of voting rules. Instead, we will only briefly touch on
two strands of this literature. The first strand is the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) and
its many generalizations.3 Like the CJT literature, the results of the present paper say
that, under certain statistical assumptions, a large population using a certain voting rule
is likely to arrive at the “correct” decision. But the goal for the CJT literature is to find
the objectively correct answer to some factual question, whereas the goal in the present
paper is to maximize social welfare.
The second strand is the literature on strategic voting and/or strategic candidacy in
large populations with some kind of randomness or uncertainty in voters’ preferences.
This literature is mainly concerned with characterizing the Nash equilibria of certain large
election games. These equilibria occasionally have surprising social welfare properties. For
example, Ledyard (1984), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987, 1993), Coughlin (1992; Theorem
3.7 and Corollary 4.4), Banks and Duggan (2004; §4) and McKelvey and Patty (2006) have
all shown that, in certain election games, there is a unique Nash equilibrium (sometimes
called a “political equilibrium”) where all the candidates select the policy which maximizes
a utilitarian SWF. But these utilitarian SWFs are based on somewhat peculiar systems
of interpersonal utility comparisons. In these models, voter behaviour is described by a
stochastic device: the probability that voter i votes for candidate C (or in some cases, the
probability that i votes at all) is a function of the difference between the cardinal utility
which i assigns to C and the cardinal utility she assigns to other candidates. Although the
different models use different stochastic devices and seek to capture different phenomena
(e.g. random private costs for voting, or random private shocks to the utility functions, or
random individual errors due to bounded rationality, or other exogenous perturbations),
2Strictly speaking, Schmitz and Troger show that these rules yield the highest ex ante expected utility
for each individual voter, before she learns her true preferences. However, in their model, all voters have
identically distributed random utility functions ex ante, so this is equivalent to maximizing the expected
value of the utilitarian SWF, and also equivalent to ex ante Pareto efficiency, as Schmitz and Troger
observe in footnote 13 of their paper.
3See Nitzan (2009, Ch.11-12) or Pivato (2013) for surveys of this literature.
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each model assumes that utility functions are translated into voting probabilities in the
same way for every voter. In this way, each model smuggles in a system of “implicit”
interpersonal utility comparisons via the stochastic device. As observed by Banks and
Duggan (2004, p.29), this makes the normative significance of the “utilitarianism” emerging
from these political equilibria somewhat unclear.
In contrast, this paper assumes that there is a pre-existing, normatively meaningful
system of cardinal interpersonal utility comparisions, explicitly described by a set of “cal-
ibration constants” which exist independently of the voting rule and any other random
factors in the model. The social planner does not know the exact values of these cal-
ibration constants, but regards them as random variables; the main result of Section 2
states that it is still possible to closely approximate the utilitarian social choice, even with
this kind of uncertainty. On the other hand, unlike the political equilibrium literature de-
scribed in the previous paragraph, this paper does not grapple with strategic issues, except
in the conclusion. Also, unlike the political equilibrium literature, this paper treats the
social alternatives as exogenous, rather than endogenizing them as the result of political
candidates competing for popularity.
2 Statistical interpersonal comparisons
First we will fix some notation which will be maintained throughout the paper. Let R
denote the set of real numbers, and let R+ be the set of positive real numbers. Let A
denote a set of social alternatives (either finite or infinite), let I be a set of voters, and let
I := |I|. (We will typically suppose that I is very large.) For every i in I, let ui : A−→R
be a cardinal utility function for voter i, and let ci > 0 be a “calibration constant”, which we
will use to make cardinal interpersonal utility comparisons. We suppose that the functions
ci ui and cj uj are interpersonally comparable for all voters i and j in I. In other words,
for any alternatives a, b, c, and d in A, if ci ui(b) − ci ui(a) = cj uj(d) − cj uj(c), then the
welfare that voter i gains in moving from alternative a to alternative b exactly the same as
the welfare that voter j gains in moving from c to d. We would therefore like to maximize
the utilitarian social welfare function UI : A−→R defined by
UI(a) :=
1
I
∑
i∈I
ci ui(a), for every alternative a in A. (1)
Let argmaxA(UI) denote the set of elements ofA which maximize UI —we will refer to these
as utilitarian optima. A utilitarian social planner wants to find a utilitarian optimum, but
she may not have enough information to do this, because of the aforementioned problems
(Pr1)-(Pr3). We can formalize these informational problems with two assumptions:
(U1) The interpersonal calibration constants {ci}i∈I are unknown. We regard {ci}i∈I
as random variables taking values in R+, which are independent, but not necessarily
identically distributed. We assume there is some constant σ2c > 0 such that, for every
voter i in I, the random variable ci has a variance less than σ2c , and an expected
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value of 1.4
(U2) The utility functions {ui}i∈I are not precisely observable. Instead, for each i in I,
we can only observe a function vi := ui + i, where i : A−→R is a random “error”
term. For each alternative a in A, we assume that the random errors {i(a)}i∈I are
independent.5 These random errors are not necessarily identically distributed, but
we assume they all have an expected value of 0 and a finite variance less than or
equal some constant σ2 > 0.
Finally, we assume that the random variables {ci}i∈I are independent of the random
functions {i}i∈I .
Assumption (U1) encodes problem (Pr1), while assumption (U2) encodes both (Pr2) and
(Pr3). Note that, while we assume {vi}i∈I and {ci}i∈I are random variables, we make
no assumptions about the mechanism generating the profile of utility functions {ui}i∈I .
These utility functions might be fixed in advance, or they might themselves be generated
by some other random process.6 If they are randomly generated, then we do not need to
assume that {ui}i∈I are identically distributed, or assume that the random variables ui(a)
and ui(b) are independent for a given voter i in I and distinct alternatives a and b in
A. (Indeed, this would be highly unrealistic.) However, we will assume the utility profile
{ui}i∈I satisfies the following boundedness condition:
(U3) There is a constant M > 0 such that, for every alternative a in A, we have
1
I
∑
i∈I
ui(a)
2 < M2.
For example, if |ui(a)| < M for every alternative a in A and every voter i in I, then (U3)
is clearly satisfied. Alternately, suppose that, for each a in A, the utility values {ui(a)}i∈I
are independent, identically distributed random variables drawn from a distribution with
mean zero and variance less than M2. If I is large, then the Law of Large Numbers says
that (U3) will hold with very high probability.
For every alternative a in A, we define the “observed” social welfare function
VI(a) :=
1
I
∑
i∈I
vi(a). (2)
Thus, VI is based on observable data (the functions {vi}i∈I), and does not require the true
values of the utility functions {ui}i∈I or the interpersonal calibration constants {ci}i∈I .
Therefore, the social planner can compute VI , and identify the alternative in A which
4The assumption that {ci}i∈I all have expected value 1 involves no loss of generality. If there was some
i in I such that E[ci] = ci 6= 1, then we could replace the utility function ui with u˜i = ci ui and replace
the random variable ci with c˜i = ci/ci; we would then have c˜i u˜i = ci ui, but E[c˜i] = 1, as desired.
5Note that we do not assume that, for a fixed voter i in I, the random errors i(a) and i(b) are
independent for different alternatives a and b in A.
6In this case, Theorem 1 (below) should be interpreted as a statement which holds for any specific
realization of these random utility functions.
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maximizes VI . Our first result says that, if the population is sufficiently large, then VI is
a good approximation of UI , so that an alternative in argmaxA(VI) will also maximize (or
almost maximize) the value of UI .
Before stating this result, we must introduce some more notation. Let δ > 0 represent a
“social suboptimality tolerance”, and let p > 0 represent the probability that this tolerance
will be exceeded (we want both of these to be small). For any values of δ and p, we define
I(δ, p) := 8
M2 σ2c + σ
2

p δ2
. (3)
Our first result says that, for any voter population larger than I(δ, p), any VI-maximizing
social alternative will produce a social welfare within δ of the theoretical optimum, with
probability at least 1− p.
Theorem 1 For every voter i in I, let ui : A−→R be a utility function. Suppose that the
profile {ui}i∈I satisfies rule (U3), and suppose {ci}i∈I and {vi}i∈I are randomly generated
according to rules (U1) and (U2). Define UI , VI : A−→R as in equations (1) and (2),
and let U∗ := max{UI(a); a ∈ A} (the optimum utilitarian social welfare). Then for any
δ > 0 and any a∗V in argmaxA(VI), we have
lim
I→∞
Prob [UI(a∗V ) ≥ U∗ − δ] = 1.
To be precise, for any p > 0 and any I ≥ I(δ, p), we have Prob [UI(a∗V ) < U∗ − δ] < p.
For example, for every alternative a in A, suppose the utilities {ui(a); i ∈ I} are indepen-
dent, uniformly distributed random variables ranging over some interval of length at most
10, contained within the interval [−9, 9] (with perhaps different subintervals of [−9, 9] for
different alternatives in A). Let M := 5; then for a large population of voters, condition
(U3) will be satisfied with extremely high probability.7 Suppose σ2c = 1 and σ
2
 = 5, and let
δ := 0.2 (i.e. 1.1% of the total utility range) and p := 0.01. Then I(δ, p) = 600 000. Thus,
for a polity of six hundred thousand voters, Theorem 1 says that, with 99% probability,
the VI-maximizing alternative will yield a UI-value within 1.1% of the theoretical optimum
U∗.
Define ∆(UI) := inf{U∗ − UI(a); a 6∈ argmaxA(UI)}; this is the minimum “social
welfare cost” of failing to choose a utilitarian optimum. If A is infinite, then ∆(UI) may
be zero. But if A is finite, then ∆(UI) > 0. If ∆(UI) > 0, then Theorem 1 implies that a
VI-optimal alternative will not merely be close, but will in fact be a utilitarian optimum,
in the limit of a large population:
Corollary 2 Assume the same hypotheses as Theorem 1. If δ ≤ ∆(UI), and I ≥ I(δ, p),
then Prob [argmaxA(VI) ⊆ argmaxA(UI)] > 1− p.
7Proof: The variance of any such uniform distribution is at most 8 13 < 9, and the square of its mean is
at most 42 = 16. Thus, its second moment will be at most 9 + 16 = 25 = 52.
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3 Relative utilitarianism
Theorem 1 deals with problems (Pr1)-(Pr3), but it does little about (Pr4). Strategic voters
will exaggerate their utility functions. One partial solution is to rescale each voter’s utility
function to range over the interval [0, 1].8 The resulting social choice rule is called Relative
utilitarianism (Dhillon, 1998; Dhillon and Mertens, 1999).
Formally, for every voter i in I let wi : A−→R be her “true” utility function. We
suppose these utility functions admit one-for-one cardinal interpersonal comparisons. In
other words, for any alternatives a, b, c, and d in A, if wi(b)−wi(a) = wj(d)−wj(c), then
the welfare that voter i gains in moving from a to b exactly the same as the welfare that
voter j gains in moving from c to d. We therefore want to maximize the utilitarian SWF
UI defined by
UI(a) :=
∑
i∈I
wi(a), for every alternative a in A. (4)
Let wi := min{wi(a); a ∈ A}. By replacing wi with the function w˜i := wi−wi if necessary,
we can suppose that min{wi(a); a ∈ A} = 0, for every voter i in I. Clearly this does not
affect the maximizer of (4).
Next, let ci := max{wi(a); a ∈ A}, and then define ui(a) := wi(a)/ci, for every voter
i in I and every alternative a in A. Then formula (4) is clearly equivalent to formula (1).
The scaling constants {ci}i∈I represent the “preference intensities” of the voters, which
we assume are unknown to the social planner; we will treat these as independent random
variables, as in assumption (U1). Note that each ui ranges over the interval [0, 1]. The
relative utilitarian social welfare function RU : A−→R is defined:
RU(a) :=
∑
i∈I
ui(a), for every alternative a in A.
For simplicity, we will suppose that the voters have perfect knowledge of their own utilities,
and that the planner is able to obtain accurate reports from them (i.e. we will neglect issues
(Pr2) and (Pr3)). In terms of assumption (U2), this means we suppose i(a) = 0, so that
vi(a) = ui(a) for every voter i in I and every alternative a in A. As in Section 2, we define
U∗ := max{UI(a); a ∈ A}.
Proposition 3 Suppose the preference intensities {ci}i∈I are independent random vari-
ables, as in assumption (U1). Let a∗RU ∈ argmaxA(RU) (the relative utilitarian social
choice). Then for any δ > 0, we have
lim
I→∞
Prob [UI(a∗RU) ≥ U∗ − δ] = 1.
To be precise: for any p > 0, if I > 8σ2c/p δ
2, then Prob [UI(a∗RU) < U
∗ − δ] < p.
8Obviously such a rescaling is not a complete solution to strategic voting. We will return to this issue
in Sections 5 and 7.
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If δ < ∆(UI), then one can also obtain a result similar to Corollary 2.
Relative utilitarianism prevents voters from strategically exaggerating their utility func-
tions, but strategic voting is still possible. In the game of strategic voting associated with
the relative utilitarian rule, each voter’s best response is to assign a utility of either 0 or 1
to each alternative in A (Nu´n˜ez and Laslier, 2013). In this case, relative utilitarianism is
de facto equivalent to approval voting. We will analyse the utilitarian efficiency of approval
voting in Section 5 below.
4 Scoring rules
Let N := A. Let s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ sN be real numbers, and define s := (s1, s2, . . . , sN). The
s-scoring rule on A is defined as follows:
1. For every voter i in I, let i denote her ordinal preferences on A.
2. For every alternative a in A, if a is ranked kth place from the bottom with respect
to i, then voter i gives a the score sk. (In particular, i gives the score s1 to her
least-prefered alternative, and the score sN to her most prefered alternative.)
3. For each alternative in A, add up the scores it gets from all voters.
4. The alternative with the highest total score is chosen.
For example, the Borda rule is the scoring rule with s = (1, 2, 3, . . . , N). The standard
plurality rule is the scoring rule with s = (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1). Recently, Apesteguia et al. (2011)
have investigated the utilitarian efficiency of scoring rules when N = 3 and |I| is small
(e.g. |I| = 2). In this section, we will show that, for any finite N , if the profile {ui}i∈I
arises from a fairly large class of statistical models, then there exists a scoring rule which
will come arbitrarily close to selecting a utilitarian optimum, with very high probability
as I→∞.
Let ρ be a probability measure on R with finite variance. For every voter i in I, let i
be voter i’s ordinal preference relation on A, and suppose voter i’s cardinal utility function
ui : A−→R is randomly generated as follows:
(R1ρ) Let {ri1, ri2, . . . , riN} be a sample of N independent, ρ-random variables. Rearrange
this sample in increasing order, to obtain ri(1) ≤ ri(2) ≤ · · · ≤ ri(N) (these are called
the order statistics of the sample).
(R2ρ) If A = {a1, a2, . . . , aN} and a1 ≺i a2 ≺i · · · ≺i aN , then set ui(a1) := ri(1), ui(a2) :=
ri(2), . . ., and ui(aN) := r
i
(N).
For example, suppose A = {a, b, c, d}, and voter i has ordinal preferences a i b i c i d.
Suppose we generate four independent, ρ-random values: ri1 = 0.14, r
i
2 = −2.62, ri3 =
−0.36, and ri4 = 1.47. Then we would set ui(a) := 1.47, ui(b) := 0.14, ui(c) := −0.36,
and ui(d) := −2.62.
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Next, let P = {i}i∈I be a profile of ordinal preferences for all voters in I. A (P , ρ)-
random utility profile is a randomly generated profile of interpersonally comparable cardinal
utility functions {ci ui}i∈I such that for every voter i in I, the utility function ui is randomly
generated from i and ρ using rules (R1ρ) and (R2ρ), while the interpersonal calibration
constants {ci}i∈I are independent random variables as in assumption (U1) from Section
2. Furthermore, we require all the random variables {rin; i ∈ I and n ∈ [1 . . . N ]}
appearing in rule (R1ρ) to be jointly independent. In particular, for each voter i in I,
we require the random utilities {rin}Nn=1 to be independent of i’s predetermined preference
order i. (Thus, it is not the case that voters with some preference orders systematically
have stronger preferences than voters with other preference orders.)
For example, suppose that {ui(a); i ∈ I and a ∈ A} is a collection of I×N independent,
ρ-random variables (this is a version of the so-called “Impartial Culture” model). For
every voter i in I, let i be the ordinal preferences corresponding to ui, and then define
P = {i}i∈I . Set ci := 1 for every voter i in I. Then {ui}i∈I is a (P , ρ)-random utility
profile. However, the model of (P , ρ)-random utility profiles is much more general than this
Impartial Culture model, because we make no assumptions about the origins of the ordinal
preference profile P = {i}i∈I . For example, P might be predetermined, or it might itself
be randomly generated by some other (unspecified) stochastic process. Furthermore, if P
is randomly generated, then (unlike the Impartial Culture model) we do not necessarily
suppose that all N ! possible ordinal preferences on A are equally likely to occur in P .9
Now, if we take a random sample of N independent random variables drawn from ρ,
and compute the order statistics of this sample, then we get N new random variables. Let
sN1 ≤ sN2 ≤ · · · ≤ sNN be the expected values of these random variables. We can define
a scoring rule on A using the vector s := (sN1 , sN2 , . . . , sNN); we will call this the ρ-scoring
rule. Our next result says that this scoring rule provides a surprisingly good approximation
of the utilitarian social choice rule for large populations. As in Section 2, we define the
utilitarian social welfare function UI by formula (1), and let U∗ := max{UI(a); a ∈ A}.
As in assumption (U1), suppose the random variables {ci}i∈I all have variance bounded
by some constant σ2c > 0.
Proposition 4 Let A be a finite set, let P = {i}i∈I be a profile of preference orders on
A, let ρ be a finite-variance probability measure on R, and let a∗scr ∈ A be the result of
applying the ρ-scoring rule to P. Let {ci ui}i∈I be any (P , ρ)-random utility profile. Then
for any δ > 0, we have
lim
I→∞
Prob [UI(a∗scr) ≥ U∗ − δ] = 1. (5)
Furthermore, if the fourth moment of ρ is finite,10 then there are constants C1, C2 > 0
9Indeed, one problem with Impartial Culture models is that, in a large population, all elements of A
end up with roughly the same average utility (due to the Law of Large Numbers), so that utilitarianism is
effectively indifferent between them, and the use of any voting rule is somewhat superfluous. The model
described here avoids this unrealistic outcome.
10The fourth moment of the probability measure ρ is the integral
∫ ∞
−∞
x4 dρ[x]. It is finite if dρ[x] decays
quickly enough as |x|→∞. For example, the fourth moment of a normal probability measure is finite.
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(determined by ρ and σ2c ) such that, for any p > 0, if I ≥ C1/p and I ≥ C2/p δ2, then
Prob [UI(a∗scr) < U
∗ − δ] < p.
If δ < ∆(UI), then one can also obtain a result similar to Corollary 2.
It is convenient to “renormalize” sN1 , s
N
2 , . . . , s
N
N to range over the interval [−1, 1], by
defining
s˜Nn :=
2 sNn − sNN − sN1
sNN − sN1
, for all n in [1 . . . N ].
This ensures that s˜NN = 1 and s˜
N
1 = −1. (For example, if N = 3, then we have s˜33 = 1
and s˜31 = −1, and only the value of s˜32 remains to be determined.) If ρ is a probability
distribution symmetrically distributed about some point in the real line, then the values
s˜N1 , s˜
N
2 , . . . , s˜
N
N will by symmetrically distributed around zero —that is, s˜
N
k = −s˜NN+1−k for
all k in [1 . . . N ]. Thus, if N is odd and k = (N + 1)/2, then s˜Nk = 0. In particular, if
N = 3, then we must have s˜32 = 0, while s˜
3
3 = 1 and s˜
3
1 = −1. Thus, we get the scoring
rule defined by the scoring vector (−1, 0, 1), which is obviously equivalent to the Borda
rule. Thus, Proposition 4 implies the next result, which says that the Borda rule is the
utilitarian-optimal scoring rule for any symmetric measure ρ. This confirms a conjecture
made by Apesteguia et al. (2011; §4.4).
Corollary 5 Suppose |A| = 3, let P = {i}i∈I be a profile of preference orders on A, and
let a∗Brd ∈ A be the result of applying the Borda rule to P. Let ρ be any symmetric, finite-
variance probability distribution on R, and let {ci ui}i∈I, UI, and U∗ be as in Proposition
4. Then for any δ > 0, we have lim
I→∞
Prob [UI(a∗Brd) ≥ U∗ − δ] = 1.
If |A| ≥ 4, then the Borda rule is no longer guaranteed to be the optimal scoring
rule; the optimal scoring rule will depend on the expected values of the order statistics
for ρ, which depend on the structure of ρ itself. For example, suppose ρ was a normal
probability distribution and |A| = 7. Then we get the following expected order statistics
(to 5 significant digits).11
s77 ≈ 1.35218,
s76 ≈ 0.75737,
s75 ≈ 0.35271,
s74 = 0,
s73 ≈ −0.35271,
s72 ≈ −0.75737,
and s71 ≈ −1.35218,
which renormalize to
s˜77 = 1,
s˜76 ≈ 0.56011,
s˜75 ≈ 0.26085,
s˜74 = 0,
s˜73 ≈ −0.26085,
s˜72 ≈ −0.56011,
and s˜71 = −1.
By comparision, the Borda rule uses the scoring vector (−1,−0.66,−0.33, 0, 0.33, 0.66, 1).
Unfortunately, the expected values of order statistics are quite hard to compute for
many probability distributions. Harter and Balakrishnan (1996) provide tables of these
11Here we suppose for simplicity that ρ is a standard normal distribution. Any other normal distribution
would yield the same values for s˜71, . . . , s˜
7
7 after renormalization.
11
expected values for most of the common probability distributions (e.g. normal, exponential,
Weibull, etc.); from this data it is easy to design the appropriate scoring rule. However,
this raises the question: what kind of distribution is ρ? This question must be settled
empirically.
5 Polarization and approval voting
If the distribution ρ is strongly concentrated around its mean (e.g. ρ is a normal dis-
tribution), and {ui}i∈I is a (P , ρ)-random profile of utility functions, then ui(a) will be
relatively close to zero for most voters i in I and most alternatives a in A. In other words,
a voter will generally assign utilities of large magnitude only to what she regards as the
very best and very worst alternatives, and assign a small-magnitude utility to most of the
other alternatives in A. Thus, this model describes a community of voters with “moderate”
political opinions.
However, on some issues, voters are highly polarized. They assign very high utilities
to some alternatives, and very low utilities to all the rest, with nothing in the middle. We
could model this with a (P , ρ)-random profile where ρ is a heavy-tailed distribution (e.g.
a Student t-distribution), which has a high probability of producing very large or very
small values. But such a symmetric distribution has the unrealistic consequence that all
voters will judge roughly half the alternatives to be “good” and the other half to be “bad”.
If ρ was a positively-skewed distribution (e.g. a Poisson, Weibull, Pareto, or log-normal
distibution), then we would end up with a more unbalanced form of polarization, where
each voter identifies only one or two alternatives as “good”, and regards almost all the
rest as being “bad”. (The opposite statement holds for negatively skewed distributions.)
However, this would still have the unrealistic feature that most voters would identify exactly
the same number of “good” (or “bad”) alternatives. In a more realistic model of political
polarization, there may be many voters who like only 10% of the alternatives, while strongly
rejecting the other 90%, but there may also be another large group of voters who are fairly
happy with 60% of the alternatives, but strongly reject the other 40%. This sort of scenario
cannot be captured with a (P , ρ)-random utility profile, for any ρ.
In this section, we will show that a utilitarian optimum for such a scenario will be
identified (with high probability) by approval voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1983). The
approval voting rule works as follows:
1. Each voter i identifies a subset of alternatives which she regards as “good enough”.
2. For each social alternative a, count how many voters regard a as good enough.
3. The alternative which is good enough for the largest number of voters is chosen.
Let γ be a finite-variance probability measure on R+ := (0,∞), and let β be a finite-
variance probability measure on R− := (−∞, 0].12 For every voter i in I, let Gi ⊆ A be
12Mnemonic: “γ” is for “good enough” and “β” is for “bad”. Note that these are not assumed to be
Gamma or Beta distributions.
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represent the set of alternatives which voter i regards as “good enough”. If Bi := A \ Gi
then we suppose i regards all alternatives in Bi as being “bad”. Suppose voter i’s cardinal
utility function ui : A−→R is randomly generated as follows:
(R1γ,β) For all g in Gi, let rig be a γ-random variable. For all b in Bi, let rib be a β-random
variable. Assume that the random variables {ria; a ∈ A} are all independent.
(R2γ,β) For every alternative a in A, let ui(a) = ria.
For example, suppose A = {a, b, c, d, e}, and Gi = {a, b, c} (so that Bi = {d, e}). Suppose
ria = 0.31, r
i
b = 0.14 and r
i
c = 0.71 are three independent γ-random variables, and let
rid = −0.67 and rie = −0.19 be two independent β-random variables. Then we would set
ui(a) := 0.31, ui(b) := 0.14, ui(c) := 0.71, ui(d) := −0.67, and ui(e) := −0.19.
Next, let G = {Gi}i∈I be a profile assigning a subset of A to each voter in I (we will call
this an approval profile on A). A (G, γ, β)-random utility profile is a profile of random utility
functions {ci ui}i∈I such that for every voter i in I, the utility function ui is randomly gen-
erated from Gi, γ and β using rules (R1γ,β) and (R2γ,β), while the interpersonal calibration
constants {ci}i∈I are independent random variables as in assumption (U1) from Section 2.
Furthermore, we require all the random variables {ria; i ∈ I and a ∈ A} appearing in rule
(R1γ,β) to be jointly independent.
We will suppose that, in approval voting, each voter i votes for all and only the alter-
natives in the set Gi.13 Our next result says that approval voting provides a surprisingly
good approximation of utilitarian social choice for large populations with utility profiles of
this kind. As in Section 2, we define the utilitarian social welfare function UI by formula
(1), and let U∗ := max{UI(a); a ∈ A}.
Proposition 6 Let A be a finite set, let G be an approval profile on A, and let a∗appr ∈ A
be the result of applying approval voting to G. Let γ and β be finite-variance probability
measures on R+ and R− respectively, and let {ci ui}i∈I be any (G, γ, β)-random utility
profile. Then for any δ > 0, we have
lim
I→∞
Prob
[
UI(a∗appr) ≥ U∗ − δ
]
= 1. (6)
Furthermore, if the fourth moments of γ and β are finite, then there are constants C1, C2 >
0 (determined by γ, β, and σ2c ) such that, for any p > 0, if I ≥ C1/p and I ≥ C2/p δ2,
then Prob
[
UI(a∗appr) < U
∗ − δ] < p.
If δ < ∆(UI), then one can also obtain a result similar to Corollary 2.
13This means that we suppose each voter is honest. But one advantage of approval voting is that the
extent of strategic voting is generally small; see (Brams and Fishburn, 1983, Ch.2) and (Laslier and Sanver,
2010, Part IV).
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6 Condorcet consistent rules
Let A be a set of alternatives, and let P = {i}i∈I be a profile of preference orders on
A. Let a ∈ A. We say that a is a Condorcet winner if, for every other b ∈ A, some
majority prefers a over b —that is, #{i ∈ I; a i b} ≥ I/2. The Condorcet winner is
one of the oldest and most well-known solution concepts in social choice theory. A voting
rule is called Condorcet consistent if it selects a Condorcet winner whenever one exists.
Many well-known voting rules are Condorcet consistent, including the Copeland rule, the
Simpson-Kramer rule, the Slater rule, the Kemeny rule, and any voting rule which selects
the winner through a sequence of pairwise majority votes.
Unfortunately, not all preference profiles admit a Condorcet winner. Furthermore, in
general, there is no relationship between Condorcet consistency and social welfare. How-
ever, in this section, we will that the Condorcet winner will be the utilitarian optimum,
for many plausible statistical models of voter preferences.
Without loss of generality, we can suppose that the utility functions {ui}i∈I admit
one-for-one cardinal interpersonal comparisons. (In the notation of assumption (U1), we
suppose ci = 1 for every voter i in I. If this is not the case, then simply replace ui with
u˜i = ci ui for each i in I.) Thus, we seek the social alternative which maximizes the
utilitarian social welfare function UI defined by
UI(a) :=
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
ui(a), for every alternative a in A. (7)
Let a and b be alternatives in A, and for every voter i in I, let uia,b := ui(a)− ui(b). Thus,
UI(a) ≥ UI(b) if and only if the mean of the set Ua,b := {uia,b}i∈I is positive. Meanwhile,
a strict majority prefers a over b if and only if the median of Ua,b is positive. Thus, a
strict majority will choose the UI-maximizing element of the pair {a, b} if and only if
sign[median(Ua,b)] = sign[mean(Ua,b)]. In this case, we say that the utility profile {ui}i∈I
is reasonable relative to a and b.14
Example 7. If |mean(Ua,b)| exceeds the standard deviation of the set Ua,b (i.e. if the
social welfare gap between the alternatives a and b is large enough), then the utility profile
{ui}i∈I is (a, b)-reasonable. To see this, note that Chebyshev’s inequality implies that
|median(Ua,b)−mean(Ua,b)| ≤ std dev(Ua,b). ♦
We say the utility profile {ui}i∈I is reasonable if it is (a, b)-reasonable, for every possible
pair a, b ∈ A. The following observation is immediate.
14If I is odd, then median[Uab] is the unique point m in Ua,b such that #{i ∈ I; uia,b ≥ m} > I/2
and #{i ∈ I; uia,b ≤ m} > I/2. However, if I is even, then median[Uab] is generally an interval [m,m]
with m ≤ m, such that #{i ∈ I; uia,b ≥ m} ≥ I/2 and #{i ∈ I; uia,b ≤ m} ≥ I/2. In this case, we
will say median[Uab] is positive if m ≥ m > 0, and we will say median[Uab] is negative if m ≤ m < 0. If
m ≤ 0 ≤ m, then we consider the “sign” of median[Uab] to be undefined (in this case, the voters are evenly
split between alternatives a and b). Note that the definition of “reasonable” specifically excludes this last
possibility.
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Proposition 8 Let U = {ui}i∈I be a cardinal utility profile, and let P = {i}i∈I be the
corresponding profile of ordinal preferences. If U is reasonable, then P admits a Condorcet
winner. Furthermore, this Condorcet winner maximizes the utilitarian social welfare func-
tion UI in equation (7).
Reasonability may seems like a heroic assumption, but the rest of this section will
show that it is actually quite plausible, under certain hypotheses. We will suppose that
the voters’ utility functions are randomly generated by some stochastic process. Our aim
is to show that, in a large population, such a randomly generated utility profile will be
reasonable, with very high probability. We will establish this result for two plausible
families of stochastic processes.
6.1 Random utility functions
Suppose A is a finite set, so that utility functions correspond to vectors in RA. Let ρ
be a probability measure on RA. We will use ρ to randomly generate utility functions
for the voters. For any distinct alternatives a and b in A, let ρa,b be the distribution of
the quantity xa − xb, where x is a ρ-random variable. We will say that the measure ρ is
reasonable if ρ has finite variance, and if mean[ρa,b] and median[ρa,b] are nonzero and have
the same sign, for all distinct alternatives a and b in A. (For example, suppose ρ is any
multivariate normal distribution on RA with mean m ∈ RA such that ma 6= mb for any
distinct a and b in A. Then ρ is reasonable.) This section’s first result says that reasonable
measures generate reasonable utility profiles.
Proposition 9 Let A be a finite set, let ρ be a reasonable probability measure on RA, and
suppose that the utility functions {ui}i∈I are independent, ρ-random variables. Then
lim
I→∞
Prob
(
The utility profile {ui}i∈I is reasonable
)
= 1.
To be precise, there are constants q ∈ (0, 1) and C > 0 (determined by the structure of ρ)
such that, if I is large enough, then
Prob
(
{ui}i∈I is not reasonable
)
≤ |A|
2
2
(
3
√
I qI +
C
I
)
−−−−I→∞→ 0.
Remark. qI→0 very rapidly as I→∞. Thus, Prob[{ui}i∈I is not reasonable] is dominated
by the term C |A|
2
2I
. For example suppose q = 0.98. If I ≥ 10 000, then √I(0.98)I ≤ 10−85,
so we can ignore it. Suppose |A| = 7 and C = 10; Then for I = 10 000, we have
Prob
(
{ui}10000i=1 is not reasonable
)
≤ 49
2
(
3
√
I (0.98)I +
10
I
)
≈ 25 · 10
10 000
= 0.025.
In other words, a ρ-random utility profile {ui}10000i=1 will be reasonable with probability at
least 97.5%. Thus, with very high probability, the Condorcet winner of such a profile
will be the utilitarian optimum. (In particular, this holds if the utility profile {ui}10000i=1 is
generated from any multivariate normal distribution on RA whose mean coordinates are
all distinct.)
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6.2 Random ideal points
Spatial voting models are very common in the theoretical political science literature.15 In
these models, we regard RN as a space of policies described by N distinct parameters. (For
example, different coordinates of RN might represent interest rates, tax rates, expenditure
levels for various public goods or income support mechanisms, and/or the inflation and
unemployment rates.) We further suppose that each voter i in I has some “ideal point”
xi in RN , and has a distance-based utility function of the form ui(a) = −φ(‖a− xi‖) for
some increasing function φ : [0,∞)−→R. (Here, ‖•‖ is the Euclidean norm on RN .) Thus,
voter i prefers policy points in RN which are closer to her ideal point xi.
Let ρ be a continuous probability measure on RN . We will use ρ to randomly generate
the ideal points of the voters. For any vector v in RN , a v-median hyperplane of ρ is any
hyperplane Hρv ⊂ RN which is orthogonal to v, and such that at least half the mass of ρ
lies on each side of Hρv. Such a hyperplane always exists, but it might not be unique for
some vectors v in RN . However, if there is a v-median hyperplane Hρv which intersects the
support of ρ, then Hρv is the only v-median hyperplane.16 (If N = 1, then the vector v is
irrelevant, and a median “hyperplane” of ρ is actually a single point —it is any point h in
R such that ρ(−∞, h] ≥ 1
2
and ρ[h,∞) ≥ 1
2
.)
Now let φ : [0,∞)−→R be any convex increasing function (e.g. φ(x) = xp, for some
p ≥ 1). The φ-median of ρ is the set of global minima for the function Φρ : RN−→R defined
by
Φρ(m) :=
∫
RN
φ
(
‖m− x‖
)
dρ[x], for all m in RN . (8)
For example, if N = 1 and φ(x) = x for all x ≥ 0, then the φ-median of ρ is the classical
median of ρ: the point(s) in R which cut the distribution of ρ into two equal halves. We
will say that ρ is φ-balanced if:
(B1) The function Φρ is well-defined by formula (8);
17
(B2) The φ-median of ρ is a single point, mφρ ;
(B3) Φρ is rotationally symmetric around m
φ
ρ ; and
(B4) For every v in RN , there is a unique v-median hyperplane Hvρ , and mφρ ∈ Hvρ .
For example, suppose φ(x) = x2 for all x ≥ 0. If ρ has finite variance, then (B1) and
(B2) are satisfied, and mφρ is the mean of the distribution ρ. Indeed, a straightforward
computation yields Φρ(x) := var[ρ] +
∥∥x−mφρ∥∥2 for any x in RN .18 Thus, condition (B3)
is also satisfied. Thus, ρ is φ-balanced if and only if the mean of ρ lies in every median
hyperplane of ρ. In particular:
15See e.g. Hinich and Munger (1997) or Enelow and Hinich (2008) for introductions to this literature.
16A point x in RN is in the support of ρ if ρ[U ] > 0 for any open set U ⊆ RN which contains x. Thus,
Hρv intersects the support of ρ if and only if ρ[U ] > 0 for any open set U ⊆ RN which contains Hρv.
17This means that ρ(x)→0 fast enough as ‖x‖→∞.
18This result is sometimes attributed to Christiaan Huygens.
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• Any multivariate normal probability measure is φ-balanced. (Proof: Any one-dimensional
projection of a normal probability measure is normal, and in a one-dimensional nor-
mal measure, the mean coincides with the median.)
• If ρ is a φ-balanced measure on RN , and F : RN−→RM is an affine transformation,
then F (ρ) is a φ-balanced measure on RM . (Proof: F maps the mean of ρ to the
mean of F (ρ). Meanwhile, the F -preimage of any median hyperplane of F (ρ) is a
median hyperplane of ρ.)
• If N = 1, then ρ is φ-balanced if ρ has finite variance and is symmetrically distributed
about some point m contained in the support of ρ. (For example, a uniform distribu-
tion on an interval is φ-balanced. So is the Laplace double-exponential distribution.)
More generally, the next result says that most rotationally symmetric probability measures
are φ-balanced.
Proposition 10 Let ρ be any probability measure on R which is symmetrically distributed
about some point m in the support of ρ. Or, let N ≥ 2, and let ρ be any probability
measure on RN which is rotationally symmetric around some point m in RN . Then for
every strictly convex increasing function φ : [0,∞)−→R satisfying (B1), the measure ρ is
φ-balanced, with mφρ = m.
Our last result says that, if any φ-balanced measure is used to generate a random
collection of ideal points, which in turn is used to obtain a profile of distance-based utility
functions, then this utility profile will be reasonable, with very high probability.
Proposition 11 Let φ : [0,∞)−→R be a convex increasing function, and let ρ be a φ-
balanced probability measure on RN with φ-median point mφρ . Let A ⊂ RN be a finite set
of alternatives, such that
∥∥a−mφρ∥∥ 6= ∥∥b−mφρ∥∥ for any distinct a,b in A. Finally, let
{xi}i∈I be a set of independent ρ-random points in RN . For every voter i in I, suppose
her utility function ui : A−→R is given by ui(a) = −φ(‖a− xi‖) for all a in A. Then
lim
I→∞
Prob
(
The utility profile {ui}i∈I is reasonable
)
= 1.
For example, suppose φ(x) = x2, so that ui(a) = −‖a− xi‖2 for every voter i in I and
every alternative a in A. (This is a very common spatial voting model.) If {xi}i∈I are
independent random points drawn from any multivariate normal distribution on RN , and
|I| is sufficiently large, then Proposition 11 says that the utility profile {ui}i∈I will be
reasonable, with very high probability. Thus, with very high probability, the Condorcet
winner of such a profile will be the utilitarian optimum.
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6.3 Almost-reasonable profiles
If a utility profile U is not reasonable, then Proposition 8 does not apply; there may be
no Condorcet winner, and even if there is, the Condorcet winner is not guaranteed to
be a utilitarian optimum. However, if U is “close” to reasonable, then a suitably chosen
Condorcet-consistent voting rule may still have a high probability of selecting a utilitarian
optimum. For example, consider the Copeland rule, which chooses the alternative with the
highest Copeland score. (The Copeland score of an alternative a is defined as #{b ∈ A;
some majority prefers a over b} −#{b ∈ A; some majority prefers b over a}.) Suppose
that, for every a, b ∈ A, there is a small probability that the profile U will fail to be
(a, b)-reasonable, and that this probability is decreasing as a function of the average utility
gap between a and b (as suggested by Example 7). Also suppose that these reasonability
failures are independent random variables. Then the Copeland score of each alternative
should be a good estimator of the “true” ranking of that alternative by the utilitarian social
welfare order. Thus, the Copeland winner should either be optimal or close-to-optimal with
respect to the utilitarian social welfare order. By a similar argument, the ordering of A
determined by the Slater rule should be a good estimate of the ordering of A determined
by the utilitarian social welfare order. These are interesting questions for future research.
7 Conclusion
This paper has neglected strategic voting and implementation issues. That is because
these issues have already been adequately addressed in other literature. For example, the
Condorcet winner (and thus, the utilitarian optimum, under the hypotheses of Proposition
8) is the outcome of sophisticated voting under any binary voting agenda (Miller, 1977,
Proposition 8’).19 Meanwhile, the central premise of our results in Sections 2 to 5 is that it
is enough to obtain an arbitrarily high probability of selecting a utilitarian optimum, rather
than certainty. This is exactly the same premise as the theory of virtual implementation
introduced by Matsushima (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991). Virtual implementation is
an extremely powerful and versatile implementation technology. For example, if the voters
have complete information about one another, then any social choice rule can be virtually
implemented in Nash equilibrium (Abreu and Sen, 1991) or iterated undominated strategies
(Abreu and Matsushima, 1992). Even with incomplete information, a very large class of
social choice rules can be virtually implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Serrano
and Vohra, 2005), or even robustly virtually implemented (Artemov et al., 2013). Since
virtual implementation is the implementation technology most suited to the probabilistic
approach taken in this paper, we consider the implementation problem to be essentially
solved, for our purposes.
According to conventional wisdom, utilitarianism is a nice idea in theory, but totally
impossible to achieve in practice. The results of this paper suggest the opposite conclusion:
19See also Bag et al. (2009) and Horan (2013) for more extensive analyses of the implementation of
Condorcet-consistent rules via pairwise voting agendas and other multistage elimination procedures.
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utilitarianism is not merely possible, but actually fairly easy to achieve —at least as long as
we are willing to tolerate a small amount of inefficiency, and as long as we have a sufficiently
large population conforming to certain statistical regularities. These statistical regularities
are the key assumption, of course. The results on scoring rules and approval voting in
Section 4 and Section 5 require the statistical distribution of voters’ utility functions to
have a fairly specific form. But the Condorcet results of Section 6 are applicable to a
much broader class of utility distributions. Which class of probability distributions (if
any) best describes the statistical distribution of utility functions in society? Is the class
of distributions the same from one social decision to the next? These questions must be
answered empirically. If the results of these empirical investigations are affirmative, then
“statistical” utilitarianism is indeed feasible. But is it desirable? This is a question of
political philosophy.
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Appendix: Proofs
Lemma A1 Let {ui}i∈I, {vi}i∈I, and {ci}i∈I be as in Theorem 1. Let δ > 0, let p > 0,
and suppose I ≥ I(δ, p). For all a ∈ A, we have Prob [|VI(a)− UI(a)| > δ2] < p2 .
Proof. For all a ∈ A, the quantity UI(a)−VI(a) is a random variable. We will first compute
its expected value and the variance of its distribution.
Claim 1: For all a ∈ A, E[UI(a)− VI(a)] = 0.
Proof. For all a ∈ A,
UI(a)− VI(a) ()
1
I
∑
i∈I
ci ui(a)− 1
I
∑
i∈I
vi(a)
(‡)
1
I
∑
i∈I
ci ui(a)− 1
I
∑
i∈I
(
ui(a) + i(a)
)
=
1
I
∑
i∈I
(
(ci − 1)ui(a)− i(a)
)
, (A1)
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where (∗) is by defining equations (1) and (2), and (†) is by assumption (U2). Thus,
E[UI(a)− VI(a)] = 1
I
∑
i∈I
E
[
(ci − 1)ui(a)− i(a)
]
=
1
I
∑
i∈I
(
E[(ci − 1)ui(a)]− E[i(a)]
)
(∗)
1
I
∑
i∈I
(
ui(a) · E[ci − 1] + 0
)
(†)
1
I
∑
i∈I
ui(a) · 0 = 0.
as desired. Here, (∗) is because, ui(a) is a constant and E[i(a)] = 0 for all i ∈ I,
while (†) is because E[ci] = 1 for all i ∈ I. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: For all a ∈ A, var[UI(a)− VI(a)] ≤ M
2 · σ2c + σ2
I
.
Proof. For all a ∈ A,
var[UI(a)− VI(a)] (†) var
[
1
I
∑
i∈I
(
(ci − 1)ui(a)− i(a)
)]
=
1
I2
var
[∑
i∈I
(
(ci − 1)ui(a)− i(a)
)]
(∗)
1
I2
∑
i∈I
(
var [(ci − 1)ui(a)] + var [i(a)]
)
=
1
I2
∑
i∈I
(
ui(a)
2 · var [ci] + var [i(a)]
)
≤
()
1
I2
∑
i∈I
(
ui(a)
2 · σ2c + σ2
)
=
σ2c
I
(
1
I
∑
i∈I
ui(a)
2
)
+
1
I2
(∑
i∈I
σ2
)
≤
(‡)
σ2c M
2
I
+
σ2
I
,
as desired. Here, (†) is by equation (A1), while (∗) is because {ui(a)}i∈I are constants
and {i(a)}i∈I ∪ {ci}i∈I are all jointly independent random variables. Finally, () is
by assumptions (U1) and (U2), while (‡) is by (U3). 3 Claim 2
In conclusion, for all a ∈ A, we have
Prob
[
|VI(a)− UI(a)| > δ
2
]
<
(∗)
var[UI(a)− VI(a)]
(δ/2)2
≤
(†)
4
M2 · σ2c + σ2
I δ2
≤
()
p
2
,
as desired. Here, (∗) is by Claim 1 and Chebyshev’s inequality, (†) is by Claim 2, and
() is because I ≥ I(δ, p) by hypothesis. 2
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Proof of Theorem 1. Let b∗ ∈ argmaxA(UI); thus, UI(b∗) = U∗. Then
0 ≤ U∗ − UI(a∗V ) = UI(b∗)− UI(a∗V )
= UI(b∗)− VI(b∗) + VI(b∗)− VI(a∗V ) + VI(a∗V )− UI(a∗V )
≤ UI(b∗)− VI(b∗) + VI(a∗V )− UI(a∗V ),
where the last step is because VI(b∗)− VI(a∗V ) ≤ 0 because a∗V ∈ argmaxA(VI). Thus, if
U∗ − UI(a∗V ) > δ, then either UI(b∗)− VI(b∗) > δ2 or VI(a∗V )− UI(a∗V ) > δ2 . Thus,
Prob [U∗ − UI(a∗V ) > δ] ≤ Prob
[
|VI(b∗)− UI(b∗)| > δ
2
]
+ Prob
[
|VI(a∗V )− UI(a∗V )| >
δ
2
]
<
p
2
+
p
2
= p,
where the second inequality is by two invocations of Lemma A1. 2
Proof of Proposition 3. Let vi(a) := ui(a) for all i ∈ I and a ∈ A. Thus, if VI is defined as
in formula (2), then VI(a) = 1I RU(a) for all a ∈ A; thus, maximizing RU is equivalent
to maximizing VI . The claim now follows from Theorem 1, by setting σ2 := 0 (since we
assume i(a) = 0 for all i and a) setting M := 1 (by definition of {ui}i∈I). 2
Proof of Proposition 4. We will apply Theorem 1. For all a ∈ A and i ∈ I, define
vi(a) := s
N
k if a is ranked kth from the bottom by i. Define VI : A−→R as in equation
(2); then clearly a∗scr = argmaxA(VI).
If we take a random sample of N independent random variables drawn from ρ,
and compute the order statistics of this sample, then we get N new random vari-
ables. Let σ21, . . . , σ
2
N denote their variances. Since ρ has finite variance, it is easy
to check that σ21, . . . , σ
2
N are all finite. Define σ
2
 := max{σ21, σ22, . . . , σ2N}. Also, let
S2 := max{(sN1 )2, (sN2 )2, . . . , (sNN)2}, and choose any M >
√
S2 + σ2 .
Now, let {ci ui}i∈I be a (P , ρ)-random utility profile.
Claim 1: lim
I→∞
Prob
(
M and the profile {ui}i∈I satisfy condition (U3)
)
= 1.
Proof. Fix a ∈ A. For all i ∈ I, if a is ranked kth from the bottom by i, then ui(a) is
a random variable with mean sNk and variance σ
2
k. Thus,
E[u2i (a)] = (sNk )2 + σ2k ≤ S2 + σ2 < M2. (A2)
Thus, for any a ∈ A, the sum 1
I
∑
i∈I
ui(a)
2 is an average of I independent random vari-
ables, each with expected value smaller than M2, by inequality (A2). Thus, regardless
of how the preferences {i}i∈I are obtained, the Law of Large Numbers implies that
lim
I→∞
Prob
[
1
I
∑
i∈I
ui(a)
2 < M2
]
= 1.
Thus, since A is finite, the claim follows. 3 Claim 1
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For all i ∈ I and a ∈ A, define i(a) := vi(a) − ui(a). Then for each a ∈ A, the
set {i(a)}i∈I is a set of independent random variables, each with expected value 0 and
variance at most σ2 . Thus, the collection {i}i∈I satisfies condition (U2). Meanwhile, the
collection {ci}i∈I satisfies condition (U1) by hypothesis. Thus, combining Claim 1 with
Theorem 1 yields the desired limit equation (5). To obtain the more precise estimate of
convergence speed, we need the next observation.
Claim 2: Suppose the fourth moment of ρ is finite. Then there is some C1 > 0
(determined by ρ) such that, for any p ∈ (0, 1), if I > C1/p, then
Prob
(
M and {ui}i∈I violate condition (U3)
)
<
p
2
.
Proof. If the fourth moment of ρ is finite, then there is some C ′ > 0 such that for any
a ∈ A, the fourth moments of each of the random variables {ui(a)}i∈I is less than
C ′. In other words, the second moments of each of the random variables {ui(a)2}i∈I
is less than C ′. This implies that there is some C ′′ > 0 such that the variance of each
of {ui(a)2}i∈I is less than C ′′. Also, these random variables are independent. Thus,
var
[
1
I
∑
i∈I
ui(a)
2
]
<
C ′′
I
. (A3)
Next, inequality (A2) says each of {ui(a)2}i∈I has expected value less than M2. Thus,
E
[
1
I
∑
i∈I
ui(a)
2
]
< M2. (A4)
Thus, Chebyshev’s inequality and inequalities (A3) and (A4) imply that there is some
C1 > 0 (determined by C
′′) such that, for any p > 0, if I > C1/p, then
Prob
[
1
I
∑
i∈I
ui(a)
2 > M2
]
<
p
2|A| . (A5)
Now, if the profile {ui}i∈I and M to violate condition (U3), then 1I
∑
i∈I ui(a)
2 > M2
for some a ∈ A. Thus, adding together |A| copies of inequality (A5) proves the claim.
3 Claim 2
For any δ > 0 and p > 0, let I(δ, p) be as in equation (3). Finally, define C2 :=
16(M2 σ2c + σ
2
 ). Thus, for any p, δ ∈ (0, 1), if I > C2/p δ2, then I > I(δ, p/2), so that
Theorem 1 says
Prob
[
UI(a∗scr) < U
∗ − δ
∣∣∣ M and {ui}i∈I satisfy (U3) ] < p
2
. (A6)
If I > C1/p also, then Claim 2 applies. This, together with inequality (A6), implies that
Prob [UI(a∗scr) < U
∗ − δ] < p
2
+ p
2
= p, as desired. 2
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Proof of Proposition 6. We will apply Theorem 1, as in the proof of Proposition 4. Let g
be the mean value of γ and let b be the mean value of β; then b < 0 < g. (Since γ and β
have finite variance, the means b and g are well-defined.) For all a ∈ A and i ∈ I, define
vi(a) := b if a ∈ Bi and vi(a) := g if a ∈ Gi. Now define VI : A−→R as in equation (2);
then clearly a∗appr = argmaxA(VI).
Define σ2 := max{var[γ], var[β]}; then σ2 is finite. Also, let S2 := max{g2, b
2}, and
choose any M >
√
S2 + σ2 . Now, let {ci ui}i∈I be a (G, γ, β)-random utility profile.
By an argument very similar to the proof of Claim 1 in the proof of Proposition 4, we
obtain:
lim
I→∞
Prob
(
M and the profile {ui}i∈I satisfy condition (U3)
)
= 1. (A7)
For all i ∈ I and a ∈ A, define i(a) := vi(a) − ui(a). Then for each a ∈ A, the
set {i(a)}i∈I is a set of independent random variables, each with expected value 0 and
variance at most σ2 . Thus, the collection {i}i∈I satisfies condition (U2). Meanwhile, the
collection {ci}i∈I satisfies condition (U1) by hypothesis. Thus, combining limit equation
(A7) with Theorem 1 yields the desired limit equation (6).
Claim 1: Suppose the fourth moments of γ and β are finite. Then there is some
C1 > 0 (determined by ρ) such that, for any p ∈ (0, 1), if I > C1/p, then
Prob
(
M and {ui}i∈I violate condition (U3)
)
<
p
2
.
The proof is very similar to the proof of Claim 2 in the proof of Proposition 4.
Now, for any δ > 0 and p ∈ (0, 1), let I(δ, p) be as in equation (3). Finally, define
C2 := 16(M
2 σ2c + σ
2
 ). Thus, for any p, δ ∈ (0, 1), if I > C2/p δ2, then I > I(δ, p/2), so
that Theorem 1 says
Prob
[
UI(a∗appr) < U
∗ − δ
∣∣∣ M and {ui}i∈I satisfy (U3) ] < p
2
. (A8)
If I > C1/p also, then Claim 1 applies. This, together with inequality (A6), implies that
Prob
[
UI(a∗appr) < U
∗ − δ] < p
2
+ p
2
= p, as desired. 2
Proof of Proposition 9. For any distinct a, b,∈ A, recall that ρa,b is the distribution
of xa − xb, where x is a ρ-random variable. Thus, ρa,b has finite variance, because ρ
has finite variance. Let ma,b be the mean value of ρa,b; then ma,b 6= 0, because ρ is
reasonable. Let pa,b := ρa,b(−∞, 0) if ma,b > 0, and let pa,b := ρa,b(0,∞) if ma,b < 0.
(Equivalently, pa,b := ρ{x ∈ RA; sign(xa − xb) = −sign(mab)}.) Then pa,b < 12 ,
because sign(ma,b) = sign(median[ρa,b]), because ρ is reasonable. Let p := max{pa,b;
a, b ∈ A}; then p < 1
2
because pa,b <
1
2
for all a, b ∈ A, and A is finite. It follows that
p(1−p) < 1
4
(because the function f(x) = x(1−x) has a unique maximum at x = 1
2
, and
f(1
2
) = 1
4
). Thus, if we define q := 2
√
p(1− p), then q < 1. (For example, if p = 0.4,
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then q = 2
√
0.4 · 0.6 ≈ 0.98.) Let A := |A|, and without loss of generality, suppose
A = {1, 2, . . . , A}. For all i ∈ I, let ui := (ui1, ui2, . . . , uiA) ∈ RA be the utility function
of voter i (a ρ-random vector). For any a < b ∈ A, let Ua,b := {uia − uib}i∈I (a collection
of I independent, real-valued random variables).
Claim 1: If I is large enough, then for all distinct a, b ∈ A, we have
Prob
[
sign (median[Ua,b]) 6= sign (median[ρa,b])
]
< 3
√
I qI .
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose median(ρa,b) > 0. Let J be the smallest
integer greater than I/2. (That is: J := (I + 1)/2 if I is odd, whereas J := (I/2) + 1
if I is even.) Now, |Ua,b| = I, so20(
median(Ua,b) < 0
)
⇐⇒
(
at least J elements of Ua,b are in (−∞, 0)
)
. (A9)
For any i ∈ I, Prob[uia − uib < 0] = pa,b, and these are independent random events.
Thus, for any n ∈ [0 . . . 2J ],
Prob
(
exactly n elements of Ua,b are in (−∞, 0)
)
=
(
2J
n
)
pna,b(1− pa,b)2J−n ≤
(∗)
(
2J
n
)
pn(1− p)2J−n. Thus,
Prob
(
at least J elements of Ua,b are in (−∞, 0)
)
≤
2J∑
n=J
(
2J
n
)
pn (1− p)2J−n ≤
()
2J∑
n=J
(
2J
J
)
pJ (1− p)J
= J
(
2J
J
)
pJ (1− p)J <
(@)
J
(2J)!
(J !)2
(
p(1− p)
)I/2
(†) J
(2J)!
(J !)2
(q
2
)I ≈
(‡) J
√
2
piI
· 2I+2
(q
2
)I
= 4J
√
2
piI
· qI <
(¶)
3I
qI√
I
= 3
√
I qI . (A10)
Here, (∗) is because 0 ≤ pa,b ≤ p < 12 , and the function f(x) = xJ(1 − x)J is
increasing on the interval
[
0, 1
2
]
. Next, () is because p < 1
2
, so the mode of the p-
binomial distribution on [0 . . . 2J ] occurs at some n < J , so that
(
2J
n
)
pn (1−p)2J−n <(
2J
J
)
pJ (1−p)J for all n ∈ [J . . . 2J ]. Next, (@) is because J > I/2, and (†) is because√
p(1− p) = q/2, so [p(1− p)]I/2 = (√p(1− p))I = (q/2)I . Next, (‡) is via Stirling’s
approximation of the factorial, which says n! ≈ √2pi n (n/e)n as n→∞. Thus, if J is
large enough, then
(2J)!
(J !)2
≈
√
2pi 2J (2J/e)2J
[
√
2pi J (J/e)J ]2
=
22J√
piJ
<
2I+2√
piI/2
=
√
2
piI
· 2I+2.
20See footnote 14 for how to interpret the left-hand side of statement (A9) when I is even.
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Finally, (¶) is because 2J ≤ I+2 and 2·√2/pi ≈ 2.26, so 4J ·√2/pi ≈ (2.26)·(I+2) <
3I, if I is large enough.
We have assumed median(ρa,b) > 0. Thus, combining statement (A9) and inequality
(A10) yields the claim. 3 Claim 1
Let C := max{var[ρa,b]
m2a,b
; a, b ∈ A}; then C < ∞ because var[ρa,b] < ∞ and ma,b 6= 0 for
all distinct a, b ∈ A, and |A| is finite. For all a, b ∈ A, Chebyshev’s inequality implies
that
Prob
[
sign (mean[Ua,b]) 6= sign(ma,b)
]
<
var[ρa,b]
I m2a,b
≤ C
I
. (A11)
Now, sign (median[ρa,b]) = sign(ma,b), because ρ is reasonable. Thus, if sign (median[Ua,b]) =
sign (median[ρa,b]) and sign (mean[Ua,b]) = sign(ma,b), then sign (median[Ua,b]) = sign (mean[Ua,b]).
Conversely, if sign (median[Ua,b]) 6= sign (mean[Ua,b]), then either sign (median[Ua,b]) 6=
sign (median[ρa,b]) or sign (mean[Ua,b]) 6= sign(ma,b). Thus,
Prob
[
sign (median[Ua,b]) 6= sign (mean[Ua,b])
]
≤ Prob
[
sign (median[Ua,b]) 6= sign (median[ρa,b]) or sign (mean[Ua,b]) 6= sign(ma,b)
]
≤ Prob
[
sign (median[Ua,b]) 6= sign (median[ρa,b])
]
+ Prob
[
sign (mean[Ua,b]) 6= sign(ma,b)
]
(∗) 3
√
I qI +
C
I
, (A12)
where (∗) is by Claim 1 and inequality (A11). Thus,
Prob
(
the profile {ui}i∈I is not reasonable
)
= Prob
(
sign (median[Ua,b]) 6= sign (mean[Ua,b]) for some a < b ∈ A
)
≤
(∗)
∑
a<b∈A
(
3
√
I qI +
C
I
)
=
A(A− 1)
2
(
3
√
I qI +
C
I
)
−−−−(†)I→∞→ 0,
as desired. Here, the inequality (∗) follows from inequality (A12), and the limit (†) is a
straightforward application of l’Hospital’s rule, because 0 < q < 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 10.
Claim 1: Φρ is strictly convex.
Proof. For any x ∈ RN , define φx : RN−→R by setting φx(y) := φ (‖x− y‖) for all
y ∈ RN . First observe that φx is strictly convex. To see this, let y, z ∈ RN , and let
r ∈ (0, 1). Then
‖r y + (1− r) z− x‖ = ‖r (y − x) + (1− r) (z− x)‖
≤ r ‖y − x‖ + (1− r) ‖z− x)‖, (A13)
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by the triangle inequality. Thus,
φx (r y + (1− r) z) = φ (‖r y + (1− r) z− x‖) ≤
(∗)
φ (r ‖y − x‖ + (1− r) ‖z− x)‖)
<
(†)
r φ (‖y − x‖) + (1− r)φ (‖z− x)‖)
= r φx(y) + (1− r)φ(z), as desired. (A14)
Here, (∗) is by inequality (A13), because φ is increasing, while (†) is because φ is
strictly convex.
Now, for any y ∈ RN , the defining equation (8) says Φρ(y) =
∫
RN φx(y) dρ[x].
Thus, for any y, z ∈ RN , and any r ∈ (0, 1), we have
Φρ (r y + (1− r) z) =
∫
RN
φx (r y + (1− r) z) dρ[x]
<
(∗)
∫
RN
r φx(y) + (1− r)φx(z) dρ[x]
= r
∫
RN
φx(y) dρ[x] + (1− r)
∫
RN
φx(z) dρ[x]
= rΦρ(y) + (1− r) Φρ(z),
as desired. Here, (∗) is by inequality (A13). 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: m is the unique global minimum of Φρ.
Proof. First suppose N ≥ 2. Claim 1 implies that the global minimum of Φρ is unique.
But if ρ is rotationally symmetric around m, then so is the function Φρ. Thus, so is
the set of global minima of Φρ. Thus the (unique) global minimum must be at m.
The argument in the case N = 1 is similar, except now “rotationally symmetric
around m” is changed to “symmetric under reflection across the point m”. 3 Claim 2
Claim 3: For every v ∈ RN , the measure ρ has a unique v-median hyperplane Hρv,
and m ∈ Hρv.
Proof. We will handle the cases N = 1 and N ≥ 2 separately.
In the case N = 1, a median “hyperplane” is just a median point of ρ (the vector
v is irrelevant in this case). The theorem hypothesis states that ρ is symmetrically
distributed about m. Thus, m is a median point of ρ. But we also assumed that m
is in the support of ρ; thus, m is the only median point of ρ.
Now suppose N ≥ 2. If ρ is rotationally symmetric around m, then so is support(ρ).
Thus, support(ρ) can be written as a union of concentric spheres centred at m. Now
let v ∈ RN be any vector, and define
C−v :=
{
r ∈ RN ; v • r < v •m},
Hρv :=
{
r ∈ RN ; v • r = v •m},
and C+v :=
{
r ∈ RN ; v • r > v •m}.
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Thus, Hρv is the unique hyperplane in RN orthogonal to v and containing m. Note
that the halfspace C−v can be transformed into C+v by rotating 180 degrees through
any axis passing through m. Since ρ is rotationally symmetric around m, this implies
that ρ[C−v ] = ρ[C+v ]; thus, Hρv is a v-median hyperplane for ρ. However, we have
already noted that support(ρ) is a union of concentric spheres centred at m; thus, Hv
intersects support(ρ). Thus, Hρv is the only v-median hyperplane for ρ. This argument
works for any v ∈ RN . 3 Claim 3
By hypothesis, ρ satisfies condition (B1). Claim 2 implies that ρ satisfies conditions (B2)
and (B3), while Claim 3 implies that it satisfies condition (B4). Thus, ρ is Φ-balanced.
2
Proof of Proposition 11. Recall that A ⊂ RN . Let a,b ∈ A. Let v := b− a, and define:
Ca :=
{
r ∈ RN ; ‖r− a‖ < ‖r− b‖},
Ha,b :=
{
r ∈ RN ; ‖r− a‖ = ‖r− b‖},
and Cb :=
{
r ∈ RN ; ‖r− a‖ > ‖r− b‖}.
Then Ca and Cb are two halfspaces separated byHa,b, which is the hyperplane orthogonal
to v, and passing through the point (a + b)/2.
Claim 1: If mφρ ∈ Ca, then lim
I→∞
Prob
(
A majority of {ui}i∈I prefer a over b
)
= 1.
Proof. Let HIv ⊂ RN be any v-median hyperplane of the collection {xi}i∈I —that is, HIv
is a hyperplane in RN orthogonal to v, such that at least half the points in {xi}i∈I
lie either in HIv or on one side of HIv, and at least half the points in {xi}i∈I lie either
in HIv or on the other side of HIv. (Such a hyperplane may not be unique; if it is not
unique, then just pick one arbitrarily.)
For any i ∈ I, we have ui(a) > ui(b) if and only if xi ∈ Ca. It follows that(
A majority of {ui}i∈I prefer a over b
)
⇐⇒
(
HIv ⊂ Ca
)
. (A15)
Let Hρv be the (unique) v-median hyperplane of ρ; then condition (B4) says mφρ ∈ Hρv.
Thus, Hρv ⊂ Ca (because mφρ ∈ Ca and Hρv is parallel to Ha,b). But as I→∞, the
sample median hyperplane HIv converges to Hρv in probability (by the Weak Law of
Large Numbers). Thus, since Ca is an open set containing Hρv, we have
lim
I→∞
Prob
[HIv ⊂ Ca] = 1. (A16)
Combining statement (A15) with limit (A16) yields the claim. 3 Claim 1
Let UI :=
1
I
∑
i∈I
ui, as in equation (7).
Claim 2: If mφρ ∈ Ca, then lim
I→∞
Prob [UI(a) > UI(b)] = 1.
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Proof. Condition (B3) implies that there is some increasing function γ : [0,∞)−→R such
that Φρ(x) = γ
(∥∥x−mφρ∥∥) for all x ∈ RN . If mφρ ∈ Ca, then ∥∥a−mφρ∥∥ < ∥∥b−mφρ∥∥;
thus, Φρ(a) < Φρ(b). Fix C ∈ R with Φρ(a) < C < Φρ(b)
Let x be a ρ-random variable. From equation (8) it is clear that Φρ(a) is the expected
value of φ (‖x− a‖). Meanwhile, −UI(a) = 1I
∑
i∈I φ (‖xi − a‖) is an empirical esti-
mate of this expected value, based on the sample set {xi}i∈I . Thus, since Φρ(a) < C,
the Weak Law of Large Numbers says lim
I→∞
Prob[−UI(a) < C] = 1. By a similar
argument, lim
I→∞
Prob[−UI(b) > C] = 1. Thus, lim
I→∞
Prob [UI(a) > −C > UI(b)] = 1.
3 Claim 2
If mφρ ∈ Ca, then Claims 1 and 2 together imply that
lim
I→∞
Prob
(
The utility profile {ui}i∈I is {a, b}-reasonable
)
= 1.
We can make a similar argument in the case when mφρ ∈ Cb. Finally, it is impossible
that mφρ ∈ Ha,b, because
∥∥a−mφρ∥∥ 6= ∥∥b−mφρ∥∥ by hypothesis.
This argument holds for any pair a, b ∈ A. Since A is finite, we conclude that
lim
I→∞
Prob
(
The utility profile {ui}i∈I is reasonable
)
= 1. 2
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